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Title VII: An Overview of
Some Common Employer Pitfalls
Thomas C. Schrader*
T ITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964 and other supporting
acts and laws have established certain employment rights for
the vast majority of employees throughout the United States, and
the procedures for enforcing those rights. Substantial efforts have
been made by federal and state agencies, as well as minority interest
groups, to publicize the laws and their enforcement procedures. In
1974 it can be safely assumed that virtually all employees affected by
the equal employment laws are familiar with their rights or, minim-
ally, know where to obtain sufficient information to be fully apprised
of those rights.
Surprisingly, the corollary is not true. Employers often are
woefully uninformed regarding permitted and prohibited employ-
ment practices. Often, employment relations are a minor or even
insignificant facet of the general operation of a business. Problems
rarely occur as a result of an overt desire to violate the equal em-
ployment laws or the rights of any employees. On the contrary,
management's policies and practices are most often genuinely mo-
tivated by a desire to maintain or improve the conduct of business.
However, decisions implemented without sufficient knowledge of or
concern for protected employee rights can prove to be disastrous,
as will be discussed later in this article.
Equal Employment Laws Generally
Prior to a discussion of the many employment pitfalls in the
path of the employer, it is essential to have a basic familiarity with
the applicable laws. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended in 1972, is relatively simple in concept.' As affecting em-
ployers, Section 703 of the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
* A.B., J.D., University of Detroit; Member of the Ohio and Michigan Bars.
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or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.2
It should be noted that there are, of course, many other provisions
in the act. However, the foregoing are the fundamental prohibited
employment practices.
There are additional federal laws which prohibit discrimination
in employment, two of which have significant impact. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19673 forbids discrimination
in employment on the basis of age, against persons who are between
the ages of forty and sixty-five. The Equal Pay Act of 19634 requires
that all employees receive equal pay for equal work, regardless
of sex.
It is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which has
provided the greatest number of problems for the employer, result-
ing in a substantial amount of litigation throughout the country.
As a result, this article will focus on the enforcement provisions
contained within it, as well as on the burgeoning body of federal
court decisions under it.
To be subject to any of the provisions of Title VII, an employer
must meet certain conditions. These conditions are contained within
the definition of an employer as stated in Section 701 (b) :
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such a person .... 5
Basically, then, there are three conditions which, if present,
require the employer to operate within the limits of Title VII. These
conditions are:
A. the employer conducts a business in an industry affect-
ing interstate commerce
B. there are 15 or more persons employed by the employer
C. the employer has employed at least fifteen persons for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
during either the current year or the preceding year.
242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970).
429 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1970).
542 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
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It should be obvious that most employers meet these conditions.6
There must be included in this discussion of applicable laws,
the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 112461 and 11478. Executive
Order No. 11246 was published in September of 1965 and was
subsequently amended in 1967 to include sex discrimination.9 Revised
Order No. 4,10 effective September 30, 1972, and Revised Order No.
14,11 effective April 15, 1974, coupled with the Executive Orders,
provide certain affirmative action requirements for government con-
tractors or their subcontractors.
Section 60-60.2(a) of Revised Order No. 14 provides:
Each prime contractor or subcontractor with 50 or more
employees and a contract of $50,000 or more is required to
develop a written affirmative action program for each of
its establishments .... 12
For certain government contractors and subcontractors, mere
compliance with the various employment laws is clearly not sufficient.
They are required to develop an affirmative action program. The
enforcement agencies consider "affirmative action" to be active efforts
by an employer to eliminate any racial, sexual, or other minority
imbalances which may exist in the employer's work force. However,
an affirmative action program acceptable to the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC) must include an analysis by the em-
ployer of its under-utilization of minority employees, establishment
of goals or "quotas" relating to minority employees, a time table
within which the goals are to be accomplished, and the establishment
of a plan to meet the goals within the allotted period of time.
Failure to adopt or conform to an affirmative action program
can result in a determination by the OFCC cancelling existing con-
tracts between the government and the employer. It can also result
in a refusal to award any new government contracts. 13 It is sug-
6 It should be pointed out that the Ohio Civil Rights Act has an even broader impact,
being applicable to all employers who have four or more employees. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4122.01 et seq. (Page 1973). As a result, Ohio employers generally must take
deliberate pains to satisfy both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission guidelines to avoid, prospectively, substantial back pay
awards, protracted litigation, and payment of the employee's attorney fees.
7 3 C.F.R. 173 (Supp. 1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
8 3 C.F.R. 214 (Supp. 1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
9 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (Supp. 1967) superseded by Exec. Order No.
11478, 3 C.F.R. 214 (Supp. 1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972).
1037 Fed. Reg. 20536 (1972).
11 39 Fed. Reg. 5630 (1974).
12Id.
13 Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c) (2).
1442 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972).
19741
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
gested that employers should familiarize themselves with the basic
laws relating to equal employment practices. Many summary pam-
phlets are available. A minimum familiarity may considerably lessen
an employer's exposure to the various types of civil rights litigation.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
As well as enacting legislation to prohibit many forms of dis-
crimination, Title VII also established the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) .4 This agency is empowered to accept
and investigate charges of discrimination. The investigation is con-
ducted to determine the validity or invalidity of the charges and to
conclude whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe the em-
ployer has discriminated."
In order to file a charge, an aggrieved person or a member of
the commission is required to file a written statement, signed and
notarized, outlining the events which allegedly amounted to a dis-
criminatory practice. 6 Such a filing must be made within one hundred
eighty days of the employer's alleged discriminatory action.
If, after its investigation, the Commission determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer is guilty of a
discriminatory practice, the EEOC then attempts to "eliminate any
such unlawful employment practices by informal methods of con-
ference, conciliation and persuasion."'" The conciliation process does
not permit a discussion of the merits of the claim of the affected
employee by the employer. Even if the employer genuinely believes
that the EEOC has made an erroneous decision, the employer is
still required to enter into conciliation conferences. The conferences
are initiated upon the assumption that the employer has discrimin-
ated in the past and sincerely desires to correct his prior unlawful
practices. When an employer genuinely disputes the EEOC deter-
mination, the conciliation process becomes a meeting or series of
meetings of futile employer protests.
If no agreement is reached, the commission determines that
the parties are at an impasse and issues its "90 day letter" to the
employee, notifying him of the fact that conciliation has failed and
1542 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (Supp. II, 1972). For a discussion of deferral of EEOC investiga-
tion and conciliation procedures see text at note 32, infra.
1629 C.F.R. 1601.5. The amendments of 1972 permit a filing of a charge by someone on
behalf of a party. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (Supp. II, 1972). If the charge is not
sworn to or inaccurate it may be amended after it is filed. The courts apparently will not
hold form over substance. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1969).
1742 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972).
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that he (or she) may bring a civil action within ninety days.18 Prior
to the issuance of the 90 day letter the EEOC file is considered to
be confidential. The employer is not permitted to view its contents.
Following the issuance of the letter the Commission file on the matter
thereupon loses its confidential status and it may then be reviewed
by the parties for use during the litigation.
In March of 1972, Title VII was amended, broadening the
powers of the Commission. 9 The amendments also liberalized certain
procedures for the benefit of those claiming relief under the Act.
The supervision of state and local governments by the EEOC was
extended,"0 as well as that of educational institution employees.
2
'
In addition, the EEOC was given the power to institute its own court
actions against employers. 2  The Amendments extended its coverage
from employers with twenty-five or more employees, to those with
fifteen or more employees.2
3
The prior law required charges to be filed by the employee with
the EEOC within ninety days of the alleged unlawful employment
practice. With the 1972 amendments this has been extended to one
hundred eighty days.2 4 A statute of limitations requiring the em-
ployee to file suit within a period of time after receipt of his "right-
to-sue" letter from EEOC was extended from thirty to ninety days.
25
The employee also was given the right to institute private litigation
after the EEOC has dismissed the charge with a finding that there
is no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has
occurred.2 6 The amended law thus attempts to ease the filing and
processing of charges against a large group of employers. Subsequent
decisions by the EEOC have succeeded to even further broaden the
effect of the law.
18 There are generally recognized two jurisdictional prerequisities that a person must meet
before filing a civil action. First there must be a proper filing with the EEOC. See Stebbins
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 910 (1968); Perrino v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3 E.P.D. 8178
(S.D. Fla. 1970), af'd per curiam 440 F.2d 791 (5th Cit. 1971). But see DeFigueiredo
v. Trans World Airlines, 322 F.Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The second prerequisite is
receipt of notice from the EEOC that conciliation efforts have failed, i.e., the 90-day letter.
See e.g., Stebbins, supra.
19PUB. L. No. 92-261 §§ 2-8, 10, 11, 13, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
2000e-1 to 6, e-8, e-9, e-13, e-1 4 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 6,
e-8, e-9, e-13, e-14, e-16, e-17 (Supp. II, 1972).
2042 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
2142 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. II, 1972).
2142 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972).
2342 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
2A42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
2542 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972).
26 Id.
19741
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission
The State of Ohio has adopted civil rights laws similar to the
federal laws.27 The chief difference is that an employer is defined
as "any person employing four or more persons in the state . . .
Virtually all employers are subject to the provisions of the Ohio
laws against discrimination. These laws are administered by the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC). The Commission's proced-
ures differ somewhat from those of the EEOC.
If the OCRC determines, after investigating a charge, that it
is probable that unlawful practices have been or are being engaged
in, it institutes conciliation conferences.29 However, if the employer
and the Commission fail to enter into a conciliation agreement, suit
is not immediately instituted. Instead, a complaint is filed by the
Commission and the matter is scheduled for a hearing before a
Hearing Examiner. The Attorney General represents the Commis-
sion and presents whatever evidence is available in support of the
complaint. 30 If the Commission determines that the employer is
guilty of discriminatory practices, it will issue an order requiring
the employer to cease and desist its unlawful practices.31 If the
employer disagrees with the Commission, it is incumbent upon it
then to seek judicial review by instituting suit in the appropriate
common pleas court.32
Often, disgruntled employees file charges with both the EEOC
and the OCRC. In this situation the EEOC is required to defer their
investigation to the appropriate state agency: in Ohio, the OCRC.33
The EEOC may make its referral to the state agency orally and
then may commence its own investigation after sixty days.Y As
a result, if the state agency is still conducting its investigation and
hearings, and EEOC begins its investigation, it is possible for an
employer to be subjected to two investigations at the same time.35
27 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 et seq. (Page 1973).
2OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (Page 1973.)
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (Page 1973).
30 /d.
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(G) (Page 1973).
32OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06 (Page 1973).
3329 C.F.R. 160.12 (1973). See Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
400 U.S. 1004 (1971).
3Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); United States v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522
(1972). It would appear that a complaint need not be refiled with the EEOC at the end
of the 60 day period. See EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968); Wright
v. Railway & Steamship Clerk, 3 E.P.D. 8174 (D. Kan. 1971); Nishiyama v. North
American Rockwell Corp., 49 F.R.D. 288 (C.D. Cal 1970).
35See Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp. 321 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Even more common is the situation in which the EEOC expe-
riences delay in the commencement of its investigation, sometimes
as long as a year or more. In many cases, the original charge is a
dead issue as far as both the OCRC and the employer are concerned,
and yet the employer is required to reopen its files, report informa-
tion, and make management personnel available for EEOC's inves-
tigation, long after the original problem has been rectified. The
investigations themselves can be costly to the employer in the amount
of time spent by its personnel in explaining its records, systems,
and policies. Many employers are required to prepare summary
charts or lists from their records, identifying present and former
employees, classifying them as to their sex, race, job category, pro-
motions, demotions, discharges, reasons for discharges, and vol-
untary terminations.
Due to the time-consuming nature of an investigation, employers
have often requested that they be subject to one investigation, by
either agency. However, as a matter of policy both the EEOC and
the OCRC insist upon conducting separate and distinct investga-
tions, although based upon the identical charge of unfair employ-
ment practices. Hopefully, the two agencies will eventually establish
a policy of accepting each other's findings and content themselves
with a single investigation.
Consequences of Discriminatory Practices
If there has been a judicial determination that the employer
has engaged in discriminatory employment practices, there can be
a number of possible undesirable consequences. Employers should
be informed of what may result from hiring or failing to hire an
employee, disciplining or discharging an employee, or for that matter,
making any change in employment conditions, where overtones of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin may be present.
Back Pay Awards
When a court determines that the employer has intentionally
engaged or is engaging in a discriminatory and therefore unlawful
practice, the court is empowered by Title VII to:
... enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not
accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing
of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or
19741
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amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person
or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable. 6
The imposition of a back pay award exposes the employer to the
entry of a substantial judgment against it. Though the act pro-
vides that a back pay award may not be granted for more than two
years before the charge was filed with the EEOC, that limitation
provides an employer with little comfort.
Assume that an employee was discharged in May of 1970, hav-
ing an annual income of $6,000. He filed a charge with the EEOC
within one hundred-eighty days of the discharge. Although the Com-
mission will immediately notify the employer of the existence of
the charge, it may take one and one-half to two years before the
matter is scheduled for an investigation and an eventual determina-
tion. Following commencement of litigation, it may easily take an-
other two years before entry of a final judgment. Without a reduc-
tion for interim earnings, the back pay award in this example (a
four-year period) would amount to $24,000 for a single employee.
A suit filed by a single employee invariably includes a claim
that he represents a class of employees similarly situated.37 If a class
action is successful, back pay awards may dramatically increase the
eventual judgment entered against the employer. In Hecht v. Cooper-
ative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc.3 the employer (C.A.R.E.)
was determined to have been guilty of sex discrimination. It was
ordered to pay back wages of $25,000. More noteworthy, however,
is Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,3 a major class action again
presenting claims of sex discrimination. During the trial of that
action, the employer agreed to a settlement and entry of an order
which included a back pay award of $931,724. There are innumer-
able decisions granting back pay awards in varying amounts.4
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (Supp. II, 1972). See Green v. Aluminum Co. of America, 3
E.P.D. 8002 (W.D. Texas 1970) for lauguage regarding the requirement that there be
a finding that the discriminatory practice was "intentional."
However, in Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973),
Westinghouse defended on the grounds of reliance on conflicting state statutes and that
therefore it did not intentionally engage in an unlawful employment practice. The court
held:
We conclude that it is now the law that discrimination based on reliance
on conflicting state statutes is an intentional unfair employment practice. In-
tentional unfair employment practices are those engaged in deliberately and
not accidentally. No wilfullness on the part of the employer need be shown to
establish a violation of Section 706(g).
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
- 7 E.P.D. 9049 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1973), approving settlement of 351 F.Supp. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
396 E.P.D. 8935 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
40See e.g., Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973) ($5,300 award); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) ($30,761
award); Jurinko v. Weigand Co., 331 F.Supp 1148 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ($15,784 award).
(Vol. 23:245
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Attorneys' Fees
Reinstatement and back wages are not the only possible penalties
to which an employer may be subject. The Court may also require
the employer to pay the employee's attorneys' fees. Section 706(k)
of the Act provides:
In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. 41
It would be fair to assume that in the example of the $24,000 back
pay award, the employer would also be required to pay the employee's
attorneys' fees. A reasonable estimate would be in the range of
$5,000 to $10,000. In the Hecht42 case, attorneys' fees were awarded
to the employee in the amount of $13,000. Having prevailed in a
class action, the court awarded the employees in the Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. 43 case $201,250 as reasonable attorneys' fees.
It becomes readily apparent that any decision of an employer
affecting employment practices must be considered carefully. It is
of crucial importance that the implementation of such decisions be
documented thoroughly to withstand charges of discriminatory con-
duct. It is quite possible to discharge an employee for what seemed
to be nondiscriminatory purposes at the time, only to subsequently
result in reinstatement of the employee with a sizable back pay
award, plus payment of the employee's attorneys' fees.
Employment Pitfalls
It would not be practical to categorize in this article the myriad
decisions detailing all prohibited employment practices. However,
certain fundamental practices, common to most employers, should
be treated. Identification and elimination of potential pitfalls will
reduce future involvement with the civil rights agencies and the
courts.
Employment Applications
Often, employment applications ask whether the applicant has
ever been arrested for any crimes other than minor traffic offenses.
A subsequent question normally inquires of convictions.
4142 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. 11, 1972). In Gunn v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 1 E.P.D.
ff 9823 (W.D. Tenn. 1967) plaintiff was permitted to recover attorney fees for that
portion of the case in which he prevailed. For recovery by unsuccessful plaintiffs, see
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
427 E.P.D. ff 9094 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1973), approving settlement of 351 F.Supp. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
43 6 E.P.D. 118935 (W.D. Pa. June 12, 1973).
19741
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.," a black applicant noted on
his employment application that he had been arrested fourteen times;
however, he had not been convicted of any crimes. The employer
refused to hire the applicant. At trial it was demonstrated through
the use of statistics that proportionately more blacks are arrested
than whites. The court found that the employer was guilty of a
discriminatory practice in refusing to hire the applicant and in
requesting discriminatory information on its employment applica-
tion. The employer was required to pay a back pay award as well as
the applicant's attorneys' fees.45
The Gregory decision was specifically limited to arrests, without
convictions. In fact, the court deliberately referred to arrests, with-
out convictions, a number of times throughout the opinion. The
decision was based upon the traditional concept that the presumption
of innocence carries through any case until there is an acceptance of
a guilty plea or a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
following a trial on the merits. The statistical evidence presented to
the court in Gregory demonstrated that blacks are arrested dispro-
portionately to whites where no convictions result. It was explained
that often blacks are arrested for suspicion of a crime, the charges
subsequently being dropped. A significant reason for such arrests
was simply due to the defendant's color. It was, therefore concluded
that the disporportionate number of blacks arrested without con-
victions was principally due to the fact that they were black. It
therefore logically follows that use of such arrest records to deter-
mine an applicant's suitability for employment is a clear violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Commission has extended the rationale of the Gregory case
to include convictions as well.46 It is submitted that such an extension
is unwarranted. For a conviction to be discriminatory in nature it
should be proven that a black is convicted because he is black. Such
a proposition ignores the requirement that a conviction can only
result if the defendant is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is not acceptable to believe that courts of law generally convict
blacks of crimes because they are black. However, due to the cur-
rent holdings of the Commission, it is suggested that questions relat-
ing to arrests and conviction records be excluded from employment
44316 F.Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), af'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
45 See Merriweather v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362 F.Supp. 670 (N.D. Ala. 1973),
where the court upheld the discharge of an employee for falsifying information on his
employment application and there was no showing of discriminatory hiring practices.
For use of statics to find discrimination see e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457
F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1970).
4EEOC Dec. No. 72-1460 (3-19-72) CCH EEOC Dec. 6341 (1973).
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applications. Instead it is recommended that a security check be
made while the employee is still on probationary status.
One employer has demonstrated the ideal method for resolving
the problem of hiring or discharging an employee with a conviction
record. In Richardson v. Hotel Corporation of America,4 7 the plaintiff
applied for a bellman position at a newly constructed hotel. Although
he admitted on his application that he had a conviction record, a
clerical error resulted in his being hired as a bellman. Shortly after
being hired, it was discovered that he had been convicted of theft
and receipt of stolen property. He was informed that he could not
continue as a bellman, but was offered another position. The employee
refused the offer and was discharged. He was replaced by another
bellman.
The court determined that a bellman's position was "security
sensitive," having access to guests' rooms, and that the employer was
justified in its policy of requiring bellmen to be reasonably free from
convictions for serious property-related crimes. However, the court
carefully pointed out certain factors which resulted in a decision
favorable to the employer. These factors included:
1. The employee was offered another job at a similar rate
of pay.
2. The employer discharged two white bellmen for the same
reasons at the same time.
3. The employer replaced the employee with a black bellman.
4. The work force of the hotel was composed of 61.7 percent
minority group members while the surrounding population
was composed of only 31.0 percent negroes.
Similar planning by any employer can be highly effective in pre-
venting unwarranted claims for relief by disgruntled employees.
Testing and Screening
After completion of an employment application, prospective
employees are usually interviewed and tested before being offered
a position with the company. Testing a prospective employee has
historically been considered to be the most reliable method of selec-
tion. It may be thought that uniformly applied testing procedures are
nondiscriminatory in character. However, the EEOC and federal
courts have held to the contrary. The leading case is Griggs v. Duke
47332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), a/I'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Power Company.8
In Griggs the employer required employees transferring into
certain higher-paying positions in the company to have a high school
education, as well as to register satisfactory scores on two profes-
sionally-prepared tests. The two tests were the Wonderlic Personnel
Test, a test designed to measure general intelligence, and the Bennet
Mechanical Comprehension Test, a test designed to measure general
mechanical aptitudes and abilities.
The Civil Rights Act provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice ... for an employer
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administra-
tion or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.49
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court determined that the
testing procedures in Griggs were invalid, having a discriminatory
effect. The Court held that neither test was intended to measure
the ability to learn or to perform a specific job. The Court further
stated that blacks have traditionally received inferior educations as
compared to whites, and it was shown statistically that blacks uni-
formly score lower than whites on such tests as the Wonderlic and
Bennet tests. Chief Justice Burger concluded:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.0 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, tests must be specifically related to measure the skills
required for a particular job. Thus, testing for a secretarial position
may properly include shorthand, typing, and transcription tests.
Machinists may be tested for their machining capabilities. A brick-
layer may be tested to determine his ability and skill in that occupa-
tion. Employers should generally be wary of purchasing profes-
sionally-developed tests unless they can be demonstrated to be job-
related.
- 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4942 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. II, 1972).
50401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also, Chance v. Board of Education, 330 F.Supp. 203 (S.D. N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Smith v. East Cleveland, 363 F.Supp. 1131
(N.D. Ohio 1973).
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Advertising
Traditionally, employers5 1 have sought employees with special
characteristics or skills through the use of help-wanted advertise-
ments in the newspaper. Since the enactment of Title VII, such
advertisements have been and continue to be carefully scrutinized
to prevent sex and age discrimination.
It has been held not permissible to advertise in such a manner
that the advertisement designates the sex of the prospective em-
ployee. Thus, advertisements cannot request "waitress," "drafts-
man," "stewardess," "salesman," "barmaid," and the like. The EEOC
revised its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex 2 and sum-
marized its position on advertising thusly:
It is a violation of Title VII for help-wanted advertising to
indicate a preference, limitation, specification or discrimina-
tion based on sex. Placement of advertisements in sex-
segregated columns is considered just such an expression of
preference.5 3
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19674 similarly
prohibits discrimination based on age.5 5 Terms still commonly used,
but not acceptable, include "college student," "age 21 to 35," "recent
college graduate," and "boy" or "girl." Employers should be cau-
tioned to avoid these seemingly technical violations. Awareness of
these prohibitions prior to placement of advertisements should suf-
ficiently alert the employer.
Pregnancy
Sex discrimination cases are recently being brought on a more
frequent basis. The principal issue being raised is the treatment of
pregnant employees, wed or unwed. Employers generally have a
policy that pregnant employees must either resign or obtain a leave
of absence from their employment a certain number of months
after having become pregnant. Usually employers request the preg-
nant employee to cease working between the end of the fourth to the
51 The term employer is used here, but employment agencies and labor organizations, as de-
fined, are also affected. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
5229 C. F. R. § 1604.5 (1973). An exception is permitted with regard to religion, sex, or
national origin (not race or color) if it is a bona fide occupational qualification and only
when it is reasonably related to the normal operation of the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e)
(Supp. II, 1972). A possible example would be an advertisement for a wet nurse, requir-
ing a female.
s37 EEOC ANN. REP. (1972).
54 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970).
-s 29 U.S.C. § 623 (e) (1970). Section 631 limits the Act to persons between the ages of 40
and 65.
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end of the sixth month of pregnancy. A number of employer justi-
fications are offered, including protection of the affected employee's
health, as well as the health of the unborn child.
Such a policy is squarely in violation with the EEOC Sex Dis-
crimination Guidelines. 6 The following is the most significant para-
graph detailing the Commission's viewpoint:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscar-
riage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are,
for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and
should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connec-
tion with employment. Written and unwritten employment
policies and practices involving matters such as the com-
mencement and duration of leave, the availability of exten-
sions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and priv-
ileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or
informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are
applied to other temporary disabilities."
The EEOC, and more recently some federal courts,5 have held
that the establishing of any kind of policy in this area amounts to
sex discrimination. Instead of establishing a policy, employers are
required to treat each pregnant employee on an individual basis.
Some women of frail health might be required to leave employment
at a very early stage of a pregnancy. Others of more robust health
might be able to work up to the later stages of pregnancy.
Factors to be considered include the individual employee's general
health, willingness to continue work, rate of production or per-
formance, and the specific nature of her job. The EEOC in a recent
decision outlined its approach:
Title VII forbids any policy for the termination of
pregnant female employees that is based solely on the fact
of pregnancy, or a specific number of months of pregnancy,
and not upon individual capacities or characteristics such as
ability to perform specific duties of employment, efficiency,
personal medical safety, or willingness to continue work.
59
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973).
57Id. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973).
0 Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Buckley v. Coyle
Public School System, 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Cleveland Board of Education v. La
Fleur, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), afl'd. - ..... U.S -..... 94 S.Ct. 791 (1974).
59 EEOC Dec. No. 73-0520, (6/14/73), 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACICES 1 6389, at 4045.
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In support of its decision, the EEOC cited Schattman v. Texas Em-
ployment Commission.60 Curiously, the EEOC noted that the authority
it relied upon had subsequently been reversed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 61 The issue involved the termination of a pregnant
employee two months prior to the expected delivery date. The district
court held that such a policy violated Title VII and the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. 62 The Court of Appeals
reversed, stating:
... [W] e hold that Mrs. Schattman had failed in her efforts
to show that the Regulation in question is unreasonable or
arbitrary or not reasonably related to a permissible state
objective. To the contrary, we are of the view, that the
Regulation is shown to be reasonable and rationally related
to a permissible state purpose.6 3
Notwithstanding the explicit reversal, the EEOC held:
Accordingly, we believe that the principle stated by the Dis-
trict Court in Schattman, which accurately reflects the Com-
mission's position, is unaffected by the Fifth Circuit's
reversal."
Recently the Supreme Court considered this question in Cleveland
Board of Education v. La Fleur.65 Here the Court found that under
the 14th amendment, not Title VII, public schools that required preg-
nant teachers to take a leave of absence at the fourth or fifth month
of pregnancy had violated the teachers' due process. The Court went
on to say that each case had to be considered on its merits and that
the school's countervailing interests did not overcome the teachers'
rights regarding marriage and children. Finally the Court found as
improper, the schools' requirement that the teacher could not return
until three months after the child was born. It can therefore be
expected that any standard policy requiring an employee to termin-
ate her employment within any period of time practically up to her
delivery date may well be deemed discriminatory in nature upon
review by the EEOC.
Garnishments
Employers have commonly enforced garnishment rules to the
effect that excessive garnishments of wages are justifiable grounds
for discharge. Besides the inconvenience inherent in processing gar-
nishment notices, certain civil liabilities are imposed upon employers
60 330 F.Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), cet. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
61 Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g 330 F.Supp.
328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
62 330 F.Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
6 Id. at 41.
"EEOC Dec. No. 73-0520, (6/14/73), 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES f" 6389, at 4045.
65 ...... U.S ........ 94 S.Ct. 791 (1974).
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for failing to respond to them. In Johnson v. Pike Corporation of
America,66 an employee's wages had been garnisheed several times.
After the issuance of several warnings, the employee was discharged
pursuant to a long standing company policy. The district court
statistically determined that minority group members suffer wage
garnishments substantially more often than others. Thereupon the
court concluded in this emphatic manner:
The discrimination practiced against members of minority
groups by an employer's policy of firing garnishees is not
really intended by the employer. It is the result of broader
patterns of exclusion and discrimination practiced by third
parties and fostered by the whole environment in which
most minorities must live. It may seem unfair that the em-
ployer should be made to suffer for the discrimination
practiced by others. But this was the price Congress deter-
mined necessary to end discrimination. If the employer were
permitted to discriminate because other employees, his cus-
tomers or third persons, were prejudiced against minorities,
the effort to break the desperate ring of discrimination
would soon fail. Similarly, if the employer were permitted
to discharge an employee because it cost a little more to
attend to the clerical work when his wages are garnisheed,
the effort to end discrimination would fail. Racial discrim-
ination in employment cannot be tolerated, the expense or
inconvenience in complying with the law notwithstanding.
67
Again, it is apparent that because the effect, not the intent of an
employer policy regarding garnishments discriminates against a
particular group of employees, it will be attacked by the EEOC and
some federal courts.
In Wallace v. Debron Corporation.6 an employee was discharged
for two garnishments received in a 12-month period. In that action
the court upheld the discharge, stating:
The plaintiff or other employees must, independently of com-
pany action, overextend his credit to be discharged. The
reasons for the policy, less efficiency and productivity, are
job-related, and the policy is sufficiently circumscribed, more
than once in a 12-month period, to prevent application on
66332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
67 Id. at 496.
68 363 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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remote events. Any employee regardless of race, who violates
the policy, is discharged. 6
Obviously the law is indecisive in this area. However, unless an
employer can clearly demonstrate that loss of production or high
administrative costs in the processing of garnishments are job-related,
it would be prudent to avoid this potential danger.
Conclusion
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a major piece of
federal legislation, is still in its infancy. As a result, there will
continue to be widely varying and sometimes contradictory decisions.
Unfortunately, the employer is often required to make a hasty
decision with all the facts, but not all the law, before him.
The EEOC has undergone a number of substantial changes
during its short existence. Many of its members nationally, as well
as locally, have come and gone, practically on an annual basis. As a
consequence, it lacks a sense of solidarity and continuity found in
other federal agencies. Undoubtedly, due to its zeal and relative youth
as a federal agency, it at times seems not to investigate a specific
charge to fairly determine its validity or nonvalidity, but instead
seeks to ferret out discriminatory practices it "knows" exist.
As mentioned at the outset, most minority employees are familiar
with their right to file discrimination charges and their ability to
institute a subsequent class action. A not uncommon practice of
certain employees is to file unjustified and actually fraudulent work-
men's compensation or unemployment compensation claims. The same
could be true of claims of discrimination. One court expressed its
concern regarding potential actions as follows:
... [A] disgruntled employee who happens to be black
may discover a weapon of revenge in the form of a major
class action suit under Title VII, when the reason for that
employee's discontent stems from causes other than race or
sex discrimination. The opportunity for harassment of em-
ployers abounds regardless of the final outcome of the
litigation.70
It is, therefore, of crucial importance that employers limit any po-
tential exposure in this area by familiarizing themeselves with the
employment practices uniformly prohibited. Thereupon, employers
must thoroughly document all employment practices so that a subse-
quent investigation will find those practices to be nondiscriminatory.
69 It should be noted that plaintiff was only the second employee fired by the defendant pur-
suant to this policy. Perhaps the court felt that this fact made the consideration of statistical
evidence unnecessary or irrelevant.
70 Tolbert v. Western Electric Co., 56 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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